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Abstract: Using data from the US, UK, Japan and Canada, this paper provides evidence on the 
benefits to an economy from “multiple intermediation buffers”. The overall conclusion is that the 
existence of active securities markets alongside banks is indeed beneficial to the stability of corporate 
financing, both during cyclical downturns and during banking and securities market crises. The benefits 
are to limit volatility arising from the normal patterns of credit demand and supply that obtain over the 
cycle, and changes in agency costs as companies’ net worth varies. They also restrict the impact of 
undue limits on credit availability arising solely from weakness on the supply side, be it from liquidity 
crises in the securities markets or from liquidity or solvency problems among financial intermediaries. 
The benefit will be greater, the more comparable the size of securities market and intermediated 
financing, as well as the larger the proportion of companies able to access both loan and securities 
markets. The analysis raises a number of policy issues and research topics for further investigation. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent speeches, Alan Greenspan (1999, 2000) has pointed out the benefits that arise from “multiple 
avenues of financial intermediation” which had helped to protect the US economy during periods  when 
either banks or bond markets suffered from financial problems. In 1990-1 and 1998, for example, he 
noted that the unaffected market moved to counteract a decline in credit granted by the market in 
crisis. By preventing a major funding gap from arising, the effects of financial turbulence on the macro 
economy were diminished. The issue has wide international resonance. Following the Asian crisis, 
securities market development is widely recommended to the countries involved for the protection it 
offers to the economy against a banking crisis (see for example Knight (1998), Stone (2000)). 
Furthermore, the development of securities markets in the euro area is likely to gather pace, shifting the 
financial system closer to the “Anglo Saxon” structure with a diminished role for banks in corporate 
financing (Davis 1999a). 
 
In this context, the aim of this paper is to investigate the patterns of external credit-market borrowing 
by the corporate sector in four major industrial countries with active securities markets, in order to 
assess the benefits of smoothing of flows arising from “multiple avenues”. We seek in particular to 
assess to what extent different crises and these countries’ varying experiences tend to back up the 
general suggestion of effective diversification. In order to provide a satisfactory overall assessment, the 
analysis has to look at the issues from a number of angles: 
 
· there are different types of credit market. We utilise data on aggregate net flows of corporate 
financing arising from domestic debt securities markets and intermediated borrowing, as well as 
gross-flow data for debt securities and intermediated borrowing in the international markets. We 
group financings solely by intermediation status and not by maturity (e.g. we do not distinguish 
within domestic securities issuance between CP and bond issuance2). The main focus is on 
quantities rather than prices, although we note that a “funding gap” may reflect price rationing as 
well as quantity rationing of credit. 
· there are different kinds of shocks needing to be smoothed via multiple avenues. Besides those 
outlined by Greenspan, i.e. systemic problems affecting credit supply either in the banking market 
or the securities market, one has to take into account the broader range of cyclical effects on the 
market which affect the supply and demand for credit. For example, there may be demand shocks 
                                              
2  In fact, much of the discussion of “multiple channels” has related to long term financings. Unfortunately, 
although one can usually divide securities between money market and bond market issues, the division of short 
and long term is not readily made in the data for bank lending. 
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arising from the cycle and also supply side effects arising e.g. from changes in markets’ 
perceptions of risk. Whereas the systemic shocks are in a sense “disequilibrium phenomena”, that 
may lead to credit rationing regardless of the credit standing of the borrowers, the cyclical shocks 
reflect “equilibrium patterns” where credit standing and demand for funds are the major driving 
forces. 
· the access of borrowers to markets varies, which will affect benefits arising from multiple avenues. 
Some borrowers, such as small firms, can only access domestic banking markets. A second group 
can access both domestic banks and securities markets. A third will also be able to access 
international banking and bond markets3. While we do not have disaggregated data allowing for 
these separate types, we seek to take into account their existence and relevance in the overall 
analysis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we look at the longer term patterns, correlations and 
volatilities of the different financial flows (derived from national flow-of-funds data for the US, UK, 
Japan and Canada), to gain an overall impression of the cyclical trends in the different financial flows 
and whether they act to smooth overall financing. We then go on to focus specifically on changes in 
intermediated and non-intermediated financial flows during periods of financial turbulence. It is 
investigated inter alia whether there have been periods even in countries with a diversified financial 
system where financial difficulties have affected both markets simultaneously. We also examine the 
financing patterns in the international capital markets from the countries concerned, to assess whether 
they provided a further buffer against credit rationing for those firms of sufficient standing. 
 
An investigation of simple shifts in financing would not, however, provide a complete account of 
securities/loan substitution and the benefits of “multiple avenues”. In order to assess what “equilibrium 
behaviour” would be expected in response to cyclical shocks, we need consider underlying corporate 
financing behaviour and the forces driving it, as set out in Section 3. Important background to this on 
the theoretical side includes both theories of corporate financing based on agency costs and 
asymmetric information, as well as some of the complementary theories of financial intermediation 
(which illustrate why firms borrow from banks as opposed to securities markets).  
 
These theories help us to interpret the patterns in the data shown in Section 2 as involving different 
regimes. The “equilibrium” mechanisms may be expected to operate during periods when financial 
markets are operating normally. On the  other hand, when there is systemic risk there may be a supply-
                                              
3  In practice a wider range of firms can access banking than bond markets internationally (see Davis and 
Mayer 1991). 
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side blockage in credit supply, which entails rationing for firms regardless of their credit demand and 
their credit quality. The theories also motivate a simple modelling exercise on determinants of the flows, 
provided in Section 4. This permits us, first, to further illustrate the differences between the 
determinants of securities and banking flows (thus further demonstrating their complementarity), and 
second to provide a counter-factual estimate of what changes in flows could be expected on the basis 
of normal cyclical behaviour, in order to judge the “abnormality” of market behaviour in the wake of 
systemic crises.  
 
In these empirical sections, we focus principally on the US, Canada, UK and Japan over 1970-2000, 
using flow of funds data for loans, securities issuance and total credit market financing by the corporate 
sector. These are complemented by an examination of equity issuance and trade credit and data from 
the international capital markets. We choose these economies for being among the most securitised at 
present, and thus possible models for EMEs and for the euro area. 
 
Section 5 examines some analytical and policy issues arising from the topic of multiple avenues, 
including whether there is a risk that banks and markets could collapse together, the vulnerability of 
some sectors of the economy even if there are multiple avenues, the costs of crises in banks and in 
securities markets, the role of the authorities, and the possible behaviour of a financial system in 
transition to multiple avenues. We also offer some suggestions for further work. 
 
A concluding section takes stock of the overall message from the work. We contend that the overall 
results, which are inevitably tentative rather  than conclusive, cast favourable light on the stability of 
advanced financial systems to an extent dependent on the size of securities markets. In this context, 
beneficial effects of multiple avenues of intermediation are largely confined to the United States and 
Canada and are not very evident in the UK and Japan where external debt financing is dominated by 
banks. Access to international capital markets is a further safety valve, which is available to high-
quality borrowers within financial systems, whether or not there are developed domestic securities 
markets. 
 
2 Patterns of bond issuance and lending –long-term patterns and shifts during 
turbulence  
 
To reiterate the motivation for the work that follows, it is clearly desirable to avoid additional 
constraints on the provision of external financing to corporations from the supply side, owing to a 
financial crisis among banks and/or in the securities markets. If this leads to credit rationing (by price or 
quantity) which is otherwise unwarranted by the state of the corporate sector, there may be further 
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real economic effects via reduced corporate expenditures, while in the context of a recession such 
credit rationing may lead to liquidity crises for firms and ultimately bankruptcies. This implies that the 
smooth provision of finance to corporations is essential to the development of the economy as a whole, 
while dysfunction can lead to major losses to the economy, as occurred in the Asian crisis (Stone 
2000). The question that arises is whether securitised financial systems are particularly well-able to 
maintain such smooth provision of financing via offsetting shifts in the availability of intermediated and 
non-intermediated debt finance. 
 
We begin our empirical assessment of corporate financing in a securitised economy by illustrating in 
Section 2.1 the overall patterns of corporate credit market financing over time, before focusing in 
Section 2.2 on patterns of issuance that have actually occurred during crises. Following the objective 
set out above, the que stion posed is whether shocks affecting the financial sector have been followed 
by sharp and undue declines in total financing, either arising from declines in bank lending or bond 
issuance, or whether it has been damped by an opposite reaction of the “other” market to shocks 
affecting a given sector. We do not for the present seek to allow for the normal cyclical interaction 
between supply and demand for lending (this issue addressed further in Section 4). Finally in Section 
2.3 we look at euromarket financing patterns, so as to assess whether international markets offer a 
buffer against domestic financial turbulence. 
 
The raw material for this work are respectively, flow data on funds raised in the credit market by non-
financial corporations from the flow-of-funds data for the US, UK, Japan and Canada over 1970-1999, 
as well as gross issuance data for the euromarkets from the private non-financial corporate sector in 
the same four countries over 1980-2000. The flow of funds data are respectively from the US Flow of 
Funds (produced by the Federal Reserve Board), UK Financial Statistics (Office of National Statistics), 
Canadian National Income and Expenditure data (Statistics Canada) and Japanese flow of funds data 
(Bank of Japan); the euromarkets data are from Capital Markets Data Loanware and Bondware. 
 
2.1 Long term patterns of intermediated and market based debt finance  
 
As background we show data on the long term trends in corporate credit market financing since 1970 
in Charts 1-6 appended. “Real debt securities” in this and other charts is corporate bond issuance plus 
CP (where available 4) deflated by the CPI, while “real loans” is bank lending, mortgages and other 
loans to companies, similarly deflated. Real borrowing is the sum of these two sub-components. 
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Chart 1 shows the pattern for the US since 1970. Overall external financing shows a broadly cyclical 
pattern, reaching peaks in the booms of the early and late 1970s, late 1980s and mid-to-late 1990s; 
there is no single quarter throughout the period when total credit market borrowing is negative. 
Securities market financing tends throughout to be larger than lending, although this pattern is 
accentuated in the 1990s. Whereas net intermediated lending is often negative, notably in 1973-5 and 
1990-3, net securities issuance is not – the nearest is at the start of 1994. It can be seen in a rough and 
ready way that there is some negative correlation between bank lending and securities issuance, such 
that overall intermediation is more stable. Securities markets appear to smoothe aggregate flows, while 
intermediated financing is more volatile – although the issue arises whether individual borrowers are 
able to substitute, and whether this varies over time. Chart 2 looks at the shares of corporate 
borrowing, and again shows the dominance of debt securities over lending. The symmetry between the 
different types of finance is of course a matter of construction, and does not cast light (unlike Chart 1) 
on whether the forms of intermediation offer a buffer to the economy. 
 
Charts 3 and 4 show similar patterns for the UK in terms of the cyclicality of fund raising, which has 
unlike the US at times been negative. It is noteworthy that for much of the period shown, securities 
issuance was a trivial share of credit market borrowing by corporations. Only since 1991 has it become 
a significant share of the total, although slight increases were already apparent in the mid 1980s. 
 
Looking at flows in Japan (Charts 5 and 6), both cyclical and seasonal patterns are apparent in the 
credit market borrowing data. As in the UK, the scope of bond issuance was minimal until the mid-
1980s, and it fell back again in the 1990s, being frequently negative. (For a discussion of the 
liberalisation of bond market financing and its effect on large companies see Hoshi et al (1993).) 
Lending has also been periodically negative, perhaps partly for seasonal reasons, but also more 
structurally during the banking crisis and notably in 1998-9. 
 
In Canada there is shown to be a sharp increase in borrow ing in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
(accompanying an energy boom), which was followed by a corporate debt crisis in the following 
recession. In the early 1990s, net repayments of debt securities took place. Canada is shown to be 
similar to the United States in terms of the importance of securities market financing, which is 
commonly as or more important than bank lending. It contrasts with the UK and Japan, where debt 
securities issuance was peripheral in most of the years shown.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
4 CP data were not available consistently for the UK and Japan 
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The charts are complemented by simple descriptive statistics (shown in Table 1), which show the size 
and volatility of the different financing flows relative to GDP since 1970. Credit market financing is a 
similar average proportion of GDP in all four countries, varying from 3.2% in the United States to 4.9% 
in Japan. As indicated by the charts, the proportion accounted for by securities varies strongly across 
countries, with two clear groups of countries emerging. In both the US and Canada, securities flows 
account for around half of credit market financing, while in the UK and Japan the share is much lower 
(around 10-20%). Splitting the sample in 1985, there is some increase in the proportion of securities 
issuance in all four countries, but the divide between the North American countries and the others 
remains wide. This of course gives an a priori basis to expect the multiple avenues to operate more 
effectively in the US and Canada than elsewhere, depending on the correlations between the types of 
financing. In the UK and Japan the securities markets are just not large enough to take up the slack for 
a banking collapse.  
 
The right hand side of Table 1 gives an impression of volatilities of the different forms of financing 
relative to GDP. The most striking feature of the table is the very high standard deviation of Japanese 
credit market financing and its main component, bank lending. This is no doubt partly an artifact of the 
lack of seasonal adjustment (US and Canadian data are seasonally adjusted, while the UK and 
Japanese are not) but also links to the banking crisis in Japan, which has led to enormous and sustained 
falls in credit market borrowing (see Charts 5 and 6). A second point of note is that the cyclical 
volatility of bond market financing is considerably lower than that of lending in all countries. This is 
particularly relevant in the US and Canada where the series means are comparable. Volatilities relative 
to GDP tend to be higher since 1985, except for Canada (perhaps unsurprising given the massive 
volatility of financing in Canada in the early 1980s shown in Chart 7). Of course, high volatility of the 
components of borrowing may not be of concern if total borrowing is dampened by offsetting 
movements, as the data suggest – although the issue arises of how firms confined to banking markets 
may fare. 
 
Table 2 complements these data, by showing in more detail the volatility and correlation of the different 
financing flows, deflated by the CPI rather than as a ratio to GDP. These give a further view of the 
degree to whic h multiple avenues of intermediation lead to a smoothing of flows, averaged both over 
crisis and non-crisis periods. The volatility measure shown is the coefficient of variation5. In all cases, 
the coefficient of variation for total credit market financing is lower than that of the subset 
intermediated lending, suggesting immediately that there are benefits in terms of multiple avenues 
                                              
5  This is the standard deviation divided by the mean. This allows series of different magnitudes to be more 
readily compared than for the standard deviation alone. 
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relative to a system dependent on intermediated lending alone. It is also lower than the volatility of the 
subset securitie s financing, except in the US where the figure is comparable. The shortfall of the 
volatility of credit market financing relative to intermediated lending is much greater in the US and 
Canada than in the UK and Japan, reflecting the greater dominance of intermediated lending in the 
latter countries (i.e. credit market financing is itself largely intermediated lending).  
 
Table 2 also shows correlations between the two sub-series and their correlations with total credit 
market financing. These show that in all four countries, credit market financing in aggregate tends to be 
more closely correlated with loans than securities issuance, perhaps reflecting greater cyclicality of the 
latter, while the correlation between securities and loans is low – around 0.3 for all the countries except 
Canada where it is actually negative.  
 
These correlations show in a preliminary way that lending and securities will move to balance each 
other out on average over time, although the effectiveness of this will depend on the size of the 
markets. The greater stability of securities flows than intermediated flows suggests that the former 
helps to smooth overall credit flows over the cycle. Further evidence on corporate financing and 
smoothing on average over time is provided in econometric estimates given in Section 4. 
 
But these long run average data alone do not answer the question whether smoothing – either by 
securities or intermediated lending - also applies during periods of crisis in one market. It is conceivable 
that there could be a high positive correlation in such periods indicating both channels are blocked, 
owing to pervasive high risk and uncertainty. This could be balanced out in the average correlations by 
stronger diversification in normal times. Also the data do not show whether the shifts in corporate 
financing even after crises were in a sense justified by normal supply and demand conditions in the 
credit market relating to corporate financing. To address these issues, we first turn to a more detailed 
examination of the patterns in the data after various financial-sector shocks that were thought at the 
time to be likely to impact of the efficiency of financing; the second issue (of what changes in 
corporate financing would be anticipated on a “normal cyclical basis” during crisis periods) is 
addressed in Section 4.  
 
2.2 Corporate financing in crisis periods 
 
In this section we focus on financial flows at the time of systemic shocks, which originated in and 
affected the financial system, completely or largely independent from the behaviour of the corporate 
sector. These hence would be expected to impose a supply side constraint on the cost and availability 
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of finance to corporations, separate from the normal supply and demand conditions in the credit market. 
Some of the crises affected international as well as domestic markets.  
 
The periods of systemic risk are picked on a judgmental basis, with no definite benchmark to define a 
crisis event. Judgement is in our view inevitable, especially if one wishes to include securities market 
liquidity crises as well as crises affecting intermediated lending. Some types of financial instability are 
unsuitable for inclusion. For example, some countries have had long lasting problems in the financial 
sector (such as the US thrifts crisis) which had no clear crisis point, but which could have impacted on 
the efficiency of intermediation. There have also been regional crises (such as the Texas and New 
England crises), which did not impact on national credit flows but may have affected regional flows6. 
Even among the shocks considered to have national or international impact, the severity of the impact 
on the financial system varies strongly. Also the date of onset of the crises, while clear in many cases, 
must be a matter of debate in others. The small number of examples means that the work will need to 
rely on a case study approach rather than a statistical one. 
 
With these caveats in mind, the shocks selected are as follows (descriptions are provided in Davis 
(1995a), (1995b) and (1999b)): for the United States, Franklin National/Herstatt (Q2 1974); the onset of 
the LDC debt crisis (Q3 1982); the Stock Market Crash (Q4 1987); the bank capital/credit crunch (Q1 
1991); the bond market reversal (Q1 1994) and the Russia/LTCM crisis (Q3 1998). For the UK, there 
has been the Secondary Banking Crisis (Q4 1973) and the Small Banks crisis (Q1 1991). For Japan 
there is the initial monetary tightening (Q3 1990) which precipitated the fall in asset prices, as well as 
the initial peak of the banking crisis when the Jusen housing institutions were in difficult (tentatively Q4 
1993). Note however that the whole of the 1990s have seen banking problems, with another peak 
occurring when Yamaichi (Q4 1997) and later LTCB failed (see also Hutchinson and McDil l (1999)). 
Finally, for Canada, periods of systemic risk have been rather rare (partly due to the centralised and 
diversified banking system), although there were clear and present dangers during the Northlands 
banking failures (Q2 1985). 
 
Note that with the exception of the 1987 stock market crash, 1994 bond market reversal and 
Russia/LTCM in 1998, all of these events had a principal effect on banks, and hence for “multiple 
financial intermediation” to be an effective buffer, one would be looking for activity in the bond and CP 
                                              
6  Even regional crises could benefit from multiple channels, however. Research into the causes and 
consequences of the Texan crisis (Gunther et al 1995) suggest that the regional economic downturn was a key 
feature underlying the bank failures, but there was not a strong knock-on effect in terms of a local restriction on 
credit supply leading to further repercussions on the macroeconomy. Possible reasons for this were that banks 
and financial intermediaries from outside the area may have provided necessary lending, while businesses were able 
(continued) 
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markets to expand in the wake of them. The crises of 1974, 1982, 1987, 1994 and 1998 affected 
international as well as domestic markets, while the other crises were more domestic in scope, meaning 
that international markets could provide smoothing (see Section 2.3 below). It is emphasised that we 
omit at present any consideration of counterfactuals, i.e. what would be the expected pattern of 
corporate financing if the crisis had not occurred, in the light of general macroeconomic and monetary 
conditions. This issue is considered in Section 4. 
 
Looking first at the US (Table 3), there is a broad pattern of equilibration by the market less severely 
affected by the turbulence. Thus for example following the Franklin National failure (which also 
coincided with the Herstatt crisis in the international markets), lending fell by around 75% (comparing 
flows in the year prior to the crisis to those in the year beginning in the quarter of the crisis), while 
securities issuance doubled. Accordingly, total credit market borrowing fell by less than half, or by 2% 
of GDP as opposed to 3% for lending. In the bank capital crunch (dated here Q1 1991) a sharp fall in 
loans outstanding was accompanied by flat securities financing, suggesting a degree of “insurance”. 
The onset of the LDC debt crisis is an exception, as it shows a pattern of declining issuance of 
securities and falls in loans outstanding, although the fall in loans was more marked (1.6% of GDP as 
compared to 0.5% for securities). 
 
As for the three securities-market related events, they tended to show at most a minor or short term 
fall in issuance, while loans were increasing. Credit market financing was hence not adversely 
affected. Both for the stock market crash and Russia/LTCM, the fall in issuance was most apparent in 
the quarter of the crisis. Averaged out over the year following, issuance was virtually unchanged from 
the year prior to it. Whereas a more sustained fall in securities issuance took place in 1994, this was 
compensated by a strong turnaround in lending (from markedly negative to strongly positive), so that 
credit market financing actually increased. 
 
Complementing the tables of corporate credit market financing, we show in Table 4 the overall patterns 
of US equity issuance, trade credit and total demand for external finance. Generally speaking, the 
patterns shown do not suggest that the alternative sources of external finance strongly offset the 
overall shifts in fund flows generated in the credit markets. Comparing the years before and after the 
crisis, trade credit was flat or declining for all of these episodes, except for the 1994 bond market 
reversal, when it rose strongly. Equity issuance was generally low or negative, as has been the case in 
most recent years owing to equity retirements and take-overs. In most cases the figure for equity 
issuance was lower in the year following the crisis than in the year prior. The exception is the onset of 
                                                                                                                                               
to make use of commercial paper and other types of securities market financing in national markets. 
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the LDC debt crisis in 1982, when issues were somewhat higher in the year after the  crisis. As noted 
above, bank lending and securities issuance both fell, suggesting in this case a degree of equilibration 
from the equities side. 
 
Do the broadly favourable patterns for “multiple avenues of intermediation” seen in the US apply also 
to the UK and Japan? Note that these countries were chosen as having relatively active securities 
markets – and well as important episodes of financial turbulence – in recent years. They compare 
favorably in terms of bond and CP issuance with Germany, France and Italy that remained (at least till 
the onset of EMU) bank dominated. But the size of the securities market is not at all comparable with 
banking, suggesting a priori that the degree of insurance they can provide against banking problems is 
small. 
 
Consistent with this suggestion, in general, the equilibrating effect in the UK is minor in the episodes 
shown (Table 5). For example, 1973-4 saw a fall in securities issuance as loans rose slightly, despite 
the systemic concerns raised by the secondary banking crisis. (The sheer size of lending relative to 
GDP is a notable feature of this period). Following the small banks crisis of 1991, and in the 
accompanying fall in credit market financing, there was a tenfold fall in the flow of loans to companies, 
while securities rose slightly. There was still a fall in credit market financing equivalent to 4.5% of 
GDP, however. Looking at other components of the UK’s sources of funds table (Table 6), the most 
noteworthy positive contribution was by equity issuance in 1991-2, with other contributors being static 
on a year on year basis. 
 
Turning to Japan (Table 7), the agony of the economy and financial sector has persisted throughout the 
1990s, so as noted it is difficult to pick specific dates for evaluation of multiple intermediation channels. 
Suffice to say that in all three periods shown, the loans and securities financing flows weakened 
together, taking the year beginning the crisis as compared to the year before it. Trade credit (Table 8) 
fell in the aftermath of the monetary tightening and after the Yamaichi failure but became less negative 
after the banking crisis itself. It hence played a minor role in stabilising corporate financing in 1993-4, 
when other avenues were closed. 
 
As regards the patterns for Canada in Q2 1995, it is evident that the Northlands crisis only entailed a 
pause in overall corporate financing, with both loans and securities picking up strongly after falling in 
the quarter of the crisis. 
 
The interim judgement is that, consistent with the long term average correlations and size of financing, 
the US and Canada show a more favourable pattern of equilibration between lending and securities 
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than the UK and Japan. This relates both to the size and the sign of the adjustments in the “unaffected 
market”. However, we take a number of further steps in investigating this issue before reaching any 
conclusions. 
 
2.3 International capital market financing during turbulence 
 
Whereas the above -mentioned tables show the overall patterns of corporate financing, and hence 
illustrate at a most basic level the benefits of multiple avenues of intermediation, it is also of interest to 
consider the patterns of borrowing in the international capital markets both over the long term and in 
the quarters that followed the crises. Particularly where the crises were largely domestic, the 
international capital markets could offer a substitute source of finance (albeit only for firms of sufficient 
credit standing and reputation). An important additional reason to look separately at offshore financing 
is that there are offshore transactions, e.g. by foreign subsidiaries of multinationals based in the home 
country, that may be missed by domestic flow of funds data. 
 
Table 11 shows descriptive statistics for euromarket financing by private companies from the four 
countries studied, comparable to those for the domestic market shown in Table 1 (albeit only covering 
1980-2000, owing to absence of 1970s data from the sources used). Note that the financial flows are 
gross in the euromarket databases, and hence are not strictly comparable with the flow of funds. 
Another distortion is that syndicated credits in the euromarkets are recorded at their full amount when 
signed, even if the drawdown is later. Also, note facilities are recorded at the ir full potential size rather 
than at the amount of drawdown at a given time. This means they are both distorted indicators of 
actual flows, although they are sensitive in showing the amount of “credit insurance” provided. 
 
As is the case for domestic borrowing, total euromarket financing is less volatile than its components, 
given they are themselves imperfectly correlated. It is interesting to note that credit facilities (including 
both syndicated credits and euronotes) and eurobond issues are more strongly correlated with each 
other than are domestic securities and loans (compare Table 2), at least for the US and UK. The 
correlations of the various forms of euromarket financing with total domestic credit market finance 
suggest that international markets can contribute to stabilisation on average over time. All the 
correlations with this series are quite low – particularly in the cases of Japan and Canada. 
 
How did international capital market financing change when there were crises? One can distinguish the 
crises that actually affected international capital markets in some degree (LDC debt; stock market 
crash; bond market reversal; Russia/LTCM) from the others. It may be added that the data for 
international credit facilities in Japan is highly volatile owing to the sporadic nature of such financings 
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for Japanese firms. Comparing financings in the year before with the year beginning the crisis (Table 
12), the most consistent pattern observable is the decline in credits for companies in the US, UK and 
Canada after the LDC debt crisis, which severely affected international banking markets. This was not 
echoed in the eurobond market, except for Canada – for the UK and US there was a marked increase 
in issuance after the onset of the LDC debt crisis, thus offering equilibration (although note that the 
levels were quite low).  
 
The stock market crash, although it caused some initial disruption in euromarket activity (see Davis 
(1995a)) evidently did not have a long lasting effect, since virtually all the data show an increase in 
financings. A decline in eurobond issuance is apparent for all countries except the US after the bond 
market reversal, while credit facilities picked up strongly, hence offering equilibration. Finally, 
Russia/LTCM, like the stock market crash, clearly had only a short term effect on eurobond issues, 
while credits fell off in the following year. Amongst all these cases, the net overall change in 
euromarket financings was negative only for the US, Canada and Japan after the debt crisis, for Japan 
in 1994 and for the US and Canada after Russia/LTCM. Overall, the international capital markets 
show themselves to be resilient and adaptable in the wake of turbulence affecting them directly, 
according to these data. 
 
What of the domestic crises (which were generally in banking markets)? Did access to international 
capital markets offer a safety valve for the domestic corporate sector against any undue credit 
rationing that it may have faced? It appears that this was the case largely for international securities 
financing. As shown in Table 13, the overall pattern is one where eurobond issuance consistently 
picked up in the wake of the domestic crises, apart from in Japan in 1993 and 1997. On the other hand, 
international credit facilities were generally down on the wake of the domestic turbulence. The 
Canadian Northlands crisis was the only cases where both intermediated and disintermediated 
euromarkets increased in volume after the crisis. In most cases the total euromarket financing volume 
fell, again with the exception of Canada in 1985 and Japan in 1990. This evidence is less favourable for 
an equilibrating role of international capital markets.  
 
3 Implications of the theory of corporate finance for financing patterns 
 
The main focus of the previous section was on empirical patterns of financial flows during periods of 
turbulence, where emerging patterns appear broadly favourable to the benefits of multiple avenues of 
intermediation. But we suggest that in order to address multiple intermediation channels more deeply, it 
is essential to remind the reader of some key theoretical and empirical insights in corporate finance and 
financial intermediation. These help us to interpret the results of the previous section, as well as 
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motivating the empirical work on determinants of financing patterns which follows both by identifying 
relevant variables which may be expected to influence “equilibrium” patterns of finance over the cycle 
and giving some hypotheses about differences to be expected in determinants of the different types of 
finance.  
 
3.1 Credit demand, agency costs and credit rationing  
 
Concerning the demand for credit by firms, both macro and finance theory suggest that fixed 
investment and other financing vary cyclically, while interest rates also affect the demand for credit. 
As regards the sources of funds the traditional “pecking order” view of corporate finance (Myers 
1984) suggests that external debt finance, either in the form of securities or lending, ranks highly for 
borrowing firms as a source of funds. Internal funds are cheaper, but are generally limited by the scale 
of expenditures (including dividends) that tend to outstrip such internal funds increasingly during a 
cyclical upturn – while cash-flows shrink in a downturn. Whereas in principle equity issuance is also a 
feasible alternative, firms tend to see it as costly and less desirable than debt, while investors often see 
equity issuance as an adverse signal about the firm. A further alternative, the run-down of liquidity, is 
limited by the need for precautionary levels of such liquidity to be maintained to avoid liquidity crises. 
Collateral is also limited by the size and structure of the balance sheet. 
 
The supply of external debt finance, be it intermediated or not, is nevertheless problematic, as a 
consequence of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and the inability of lenders to 
write complete contracts covering borrowers’ behaviour in every eventuality. These give rise to the 
well known agency problems of the debt contr act, linked to adverse selection in advance of lending and 
moral hazard after the financing has taken place. These effects may vary over time, giving rise to 
cyclical changes in credit supply in equilibrium.  
 
In more detail, Mishkin (1991) suggests that variations in agency costs affecting credit supply may 
occur via a number of channels, prompting potentially sharp changes in the availability of corporate 
finance (the channels may also affect financial intermediaries during periods of systemic risk). First, if 
interest rates rise due to monetary tightening or merely to balance the credit market, adverse selection 
may increase sharply, giving rise to a substantial decline in credit availability. Second, heightened 
uncertainty , such that lenders find it harder to screen borrowers, increases adverse-selection problems, 
potentially reducing credit supply. It is suggested that in each case the impact is greatest on borrowers 
whose credit quality is difficult to ascertain - which are likely to be low quality (where overall borrower 
quality may be indicated by the credit quality spread). Again, collateral is a means whereby asymmetric 
information problems may be reduced (as the lender is then confident of recovering his loan even if the 
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borrower proves to be of low quality). But this means that a decrease in the valuation of assets (e.g. a 
stock market decline provoked by a change in future profit expectations), by lowering collateral values, 
sharply increases adverse selection for lenders. Reductions in credit supply will impinge more on 
low-quality borrowers for whom there is asymmetric information. A parallel mechanism operates via 
the link of net worth to moral hazard. Given asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, 
borrowers have incentives to engage in activities that may be to their advantage, but which harm the 
lender by increasing risk of default. They hence limit credit availability, or subject the borrower to 
costly monitoring. The agency problem is greater when borrowers have low net worth as they have 
less to lose from default. Besides due to stock-market declines, net worth could decline due an 
unanticipated disinflation or deflation that redistributes wealth from debtors to creditors. Such effects 
are plausibly greater for low-quality firms that have low net worth before such crises occur and which 
may be confined to banking markets. 
 
Such patterns are said to give rise to a “financial accelerator” (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1996) 
as changes in cash flow or asset prices over the cycle give rise to pro-cyclical feedback effects of 
agency costs on the cost of external finance and hence on real corporate expenditures. This will 
operate particularly via borrowers whose net worth is most heavily affected during a recession, and for 
borrowers whose activities are riskier or harder to monitor7. 
 
We are not seeking to assess effects of changes in credit on the real economy in this paper. Such 
theories and related empirical verification are nevertheless important in the present context since they 
imply that borrowing may have an inherent cyclical pattern, as firms are credit-rationed in equilibrium 
during downturns. These patterns are not avoided in any financial system, however smoothly running 
and well-diversified. If financial crises occur in periods of recession, some fall in lending may be normal 
in the light of lower demand and increased agency costs, rather than all being a consequence of 
dysfunction in the credit market.  
 
In the section below we seek to estimate equations for lending of different types, including both cyclical 
and agency cost variables, which allow us both to further assess the “multiple avenues” and also 
provide a counter factual for assessing patterns of financing during financial crises. 
                                              
7  Important empirical tests of the hypothesis include Kashyap et al (1993) using aggregate data, who show 
that after a tightening of monetary policy, commercial paper issue rises while bank lending is flat, either because 
firms are rationed from bank lending, or owing to rationing of those categories of borrowers limited to bank 
lending markets. Using micro data, Christiano et al (1996) show that following a monetary policy shock, borrowing 
of large firms rises for some time before falling off in the subsequent recession (perhaps because cash flows fall 
before expenditures can be adjusted), while borrowing of small firms (whose net worth may be hit by the monetary 
policy action) is much weaker. 
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3.2 Theories of intermediation 
 
The theories of corporate finance, agency costs and the financial accelerator outlined above tend to 
apply to debt finance in general rather than distinguishing intermediated and non-intermediated finance. 
Hence they need to be supplemented in order to understand the forces underlying the choice of 
borrowers between banks and securities as a source of such external finance, as well as possible 
asymmetries in credit rationing. There are a number of “theories of intermediation” (Davis and Mayer 
1991) that cast light on this issue, highlighting in general the advantages of banks. As a corollary they 
suggest that the determinants of intermediated and market financing may differ significantly, benefiting 
those firms able to access both types of finance. 
 
Such theories include those focusing on economies of scale (small borrowers do not access bond 
markets due to fixed costs of doing so) and commitment (that banks can offer long term relationships to 
borrowers not available in the bond market, which reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard). 
However, the most relevant in the current context are those linked to asymmetric information and 
control.  
 
Following the discussion above, the existence of asymmetries of information between borrowers and 
lenders gives rise to difficulties in screening the quality of entrepreneurs and firms to avoid adverse 
selection (Leland and Pyle 1977) and monitoring their performance to minimise moral hazard (Diamond 
1984). Leland and Pyle suggested that intermediaries can communicate proprietary information at 
lower cost than borrowers, and then sell claims to diversified portfolios of these assets to investors. 
Diamond suggests that financial intermediaries act as delegated monitors to overcome asymmetric 
information, whereby diversification reduces monitoring costs. A corollary is that market finance is only 
available to borrowers with a reputation (Diamond 1991). Hence small firms with low levels of public 
information will be served by banks, while larger firms with a higher degree of public  information will 
have the option to be served by securities markets. Whereas these theories as set out in the literature 
do not have a cyclical element, they do imply that developments that increase the need for financing by 
small firms will drive up bank finance, as will developments that increase asymmetric information and 
moral hazard. On the other hand, technological changes which impact on the technology of information 
provision and thereby reduce information asymmetry, and the related development of markets for lower 
rated bond issuance, will increase the scope for securities market financing, and hence raise the 
proportion of firms able to substitute between lending and securities.  
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Theories of intermediation based on control also highlight the incompleteness of loan contracts and 
suggest that intermediaries are better able to influence the behaviour of borrowers while a loan is 
outstanding and seize assets or restructure in the case of default than markets (Bolton 1990). The 
corollary of control theory is that a higher degree of risk in a transaction will tend to be accompanied by 
bank financing, as banks are better able to influence the behavior of borrowers while a loan is 
outstanding and seize assets or restructure in the case of default. Such patterns may potentially be 
cyclical (as default risk rises in downturns), with firms switching to banks as credit quality declines. 
Note however that this assumes lower credit quality firms can access securities in the first place - as is 
feasible if there are high-yield bond markets. 
 
An interesting point arising from the theories of intermediation is that they suggest that banks should 
provide a larger proportion of credit when there is heightened risk. Intuitively this could be taken to 
imply provision of credit in downturns, whereas we have seen that in practice it is securities market 
financing that falls less in recessions. The empirical work below casts light on the possible resolution of 
this point. Meanwhile the description of the theories of intermediation points to an additional form of 
insurance offered by multiple channels, namely that they offer a diversified set of contracts to the 
economy, which offer different forms of risk sharing. 
 
4 Econometric estimates of loan/debt securities substitution by corporate borrowers  
 
Following the above theoretical outline, we offer some estimates of the determinants of total credit 
market lending, securities issuance and loans, with the aim of (1) probing further the long term nature 
of credit market activity and the benefits of multiple avenues of intermediation, by illustrating the 
different determinants of securities and lending flows and the relationship of the types of flow in the 
four countries studied, and (2) providing a benchmark “counterfactual” change in equilibrium flows that 
would be expected to occur in crisis periods. Against this, one can evaluate  the actual changes in 
issuance and borrowing after crises for “disequilibium” supply side effects. 
 
4.1 Specification 
 
Drawing on the theory in Section 3.1, the specification seeks to combine demand and cost elements, 
with a similar basic specification being estimated for total credit market financing and the two sub-
components, securities and lending, in each of the four countries. Note that in focusing on external debt 
financing, we abstract throughout from possible changes in internal financing of corporate expenditures 
and shifts on the assets side of the corporate balance sheet. These could in principle balance out the 
effect of shocks on the liabilities side on real corporate activity. However, both the results here and 
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earlier work by Christiano et al (1996) support this abstraction, as they show credit market financing is 
the most flexible aspect.  
 
Corporate demand for external finance is considered to be related most strongly to investment 
spending, with a proviso that demand increases as the upturn proceeds and internal funds are 
exhausted, as proxied by the investment/GDP ratio. The demand for finance is also dependent on 
monetary policy and its effect on the cost of external funds (i.e. the overall level of interest rates). 
Agency costs and consequent restrictions on the supply of funds, as outlined in the theory in Section 3.1 
above, will depend on factors such as trends in share prices (proxying firms’ net worth), the corporate 
credit-quality spread for bonds (showing markets’ view of risk) and again the change in the short term 
interest rate (which increases adverse selection). For the bond and lending equations we add to these 
variables the ter m spread as indicating the relative cost of fixed and floating rate finance. Seasonal 
dummies are added where their effects are significant. 
 
We may expect the importance of the above mentioned demand and cost variables to vary between 
securities and lending markets, given the associated structural elements outlined by the theory of 
intermediation in Section 3.2 (which suggests that agency problems and risks may be more readily 
handled by banks, for example). Note that the assumption underlying the inclusion of the term spread is 
that firms may substitute between bank and bond financing. This may of course not be the case for 
many firms which are structurally confined to banking for the different reasons set out in the theory of 
intermediation set out above (small size, high risk, lack of reputation, desire for credit insurance from 
relationships), or which lose access to securities markets during downturns (e.g. high yield bond 
issuers). 
 
The dependent variables are the difference of the real financing flow in question (respectively, credit 
market financing, debt securities and lending). Because these variables are often negative, we have to 
specify the equations in linear rather than loglinear form. All the cost variables are included as levels 
and differences to allow roughly for differences between short and long run effects to be captured. 
Share prices, which are inherently trended, are included as first and second differences. On the 
demand side, we include the difference of real investment to capture short term cyclical demand 
effects, and the level of the borrowing/investment ratio and the level of the investment/GDP ratio to 
capture potential long term equilibrium effects. As shown in Table 14, all of the differenced terms are 
stationary, while some of the levels terms are I(1), notably the short rate and yield curve in several 
countries. We continue to enter these variables as levels as well as differences (also following 
economic logic that these variables cannot be trended in the long term), while noting that this may lead 
to some difficulties in interpretation of the results in respect of short and long run effects. 
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We emphasise that much more detailed estimation work would be needed for a complete 
characterisation of the determinants of these flows, which would be usable for example in forecasting. 
(The flow of funds itself is one of the more difficult areas to forecast.) For example, we deliberately 
adopt a fairly simple Hendry-style specification, so as to ensure it can be employed and compared 
readily for all the countries studied. We do not at this stage utilise the Granger-Engel two step 
procedure to estimate a cointegrating vector before estimating the short run. Further work would also 
be needed to precisely identify demand and “equilibrium” supply effects - although we do make some 
suggestions about smoothing of shocks to demand and supply in the light of differing results for the 
types of finance. The reason for simplicity is that our aim here is a limited one. At a most basic level, 
multiple channels of intermediation are of benefit if they are uncorrelated and respond to different 
variables over the cycle 8 (Section 4.2) while dummies may help us to interpret patterns of issuance and 
lending in the wake of systemic crises (Section 4.3). 
 
4.2 Results of estimation 
 
The results of the parsimonious specifications are shown in Tables 15-18. Some general comments 
may be made on the estimates. There are major differences between the determinants of securities 
issuance and lending, suggesting that there is indeed a form of diversification for the economy - which 
benefits those borrowers able to access both markets. The error-correction term relating the flow in 
question to investment is always significant, suggesting an equilibrium relationship of investment to 
flows. 
 
There appears to be a stronger cyclical component to bank lending than securities, with typically a 
significant effect of the change of real investment and the investment/GDP ratio. Securities markets 
hence provide greater smoothing on average over the cycle and related demand shocks. (The pattern 
may alternatively reflect some segmentation, with firms limited to bank finance switching over the 
cycle between bank lending and internal funds as investment rises, whereas firms accessing bond 
markets may do so more evenly over the cycle.) 
 
On the other hand, price and agency cost variables tend to emerge more frequently and with correct 
signs for the securities markets. Examples include a positive effect of share prices on securities 
issuance in the US and UK while the lending relation is negative; and a negative effect of the short rate 
                                              
8  There is an underlying assumption that effects arising from systemic crises are sufficiently rare – and 
random – not to seriously affect the coefficients of the estimates. 
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in the US, Canada and the UK. (The share price is positive for both equations in Japan.) The term 
structure relation proxying the relative cost of fixed rate funds is also correctly signed in the US and 
UK (demand for bond finance is lower when the long rate rises relative to prime). This implies that 
bank lending may smooth when securities market conditions are unfavourable. 
 
Looking at the price and agency cost variables in the lending equations, the credit quality spread enters 
with a correct negative sign for the US and Canada (lending falls when risk increases). There are also 
some apparently -perverse effects, with share price changes affecting lending negatively in the US, UK 
and Canada. This may link on the one hand to “distress borrowing” which firms unable to access 
securities undertake in a downturn linked to falling share prices, as well as scope for firms to access 
cheaper financing in the bond markets when net worth rises with share prices. The term spread enters 
negatively in the UK and Canada, which may link to cyclical patterns, possibly affecting firms unable to 
access the bond market. The short rate is positive in Japan, which may link to the overall pattern of the 
banking crisis, with the authorities cutting rates as lending (and share prices) slumped. 
 
The interim conclusions from this analysis are that there are indeed major differences between the 
economic and financial determinants of flows of lending and securities. Bank lending is more sensitive 
to the cycle (and thus markets help to smooth demand shocks) while bond markets are more sensitive 
to financial variables, reflecting costs of funds to the borrowing firm (so banks may help to smooth the 
supply of finance in such cases). While the cyclicality of lending may seem contrary to the theory of 
intermediation, the fact securities issuance is more sensitive to financial market conditions indicative of 
heightened risk enables the observation to be partly reconciled9. 
 
These are promising results for multiple avenues of intermediation and benefits of diversification. If the 
economies concerned were dependent on bank lending there would be more cyclically volatile funding 
of corporates than is shown to be possible with securities markets. As noted, some firms may not 
benefit from the multiple avenues, but these effects are not readily captured with macroeconomic 
aggregate data for the corporate sector10. 
 
An additional experiment conducted with these equations was to assess the effects of flows in the 
“other market” (i.e. intermediated financing in the securities equation, and vice versa) as an 
independent variable to test directly for offsetting shifts. We have not included these in the basic 
                                              
9  Another possible explanation is that we may be seeing compositional effects with large firms accessing 
bond markets less vulnerable to the cycle.  
10  For some estimates of lending patterns for the US using disaggregated data, see Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1992) and (1994).  
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specification as they are not demand or cost variables (note that we already have a relative price term 
in the equations, i.e. the term structure spread). This is, rather, a variant of “Granger causality testing”. 
We entered the “other flow” in terms of the difference of real financing and the lagged ratio of 
financing to investment. To avoid simultaneity, we instrumented the difference with three lags in an 
autoregressive distributed lag framework. The results are shown in Table 19. Patterns are quite 
different between the US and Canada, on the one hand, and the UK and Japan, on the other. For both 
the North American countries, there is a significant negative effect of the “other flow”, suggesting 
offsetting shifts in quantities. The term on the lagged ratio of the “other flow” to investment is 
significantly positive for each of the North American equations except for Canadian loans in the 
securities equation. In other words, the more important that one flow is for financing investment, the 
more the other will increase next period - again equilibrating. The UK and Japanese estimates are 
largely insignificant, with the exception of estimates suggesting loan growth prompts securities issuance 
(thus being complementary), while in Japan the lagged loan/investment equation enters the securities 
equation with a correct (positive) sign. This may reflect the limited role of the securities markets in 
these countries and consequent limited information in the data. 
 
For the United States, data were obtained for high-yield bond issuance from 1982:3 to 2000:311, as 
shown in Chart 9. Such issuance opens up the possibility of substitution of securities financing for a 
wider range of companies, thus increasing the smoothing benefits to the economy as a whole. While 
we do not have disaggregated data to test directly whether there is increased substitution, we do 
address some related hypotheses. For example, opening of the high yield market would be expected to 
increase securities issuance and lower bank lending. Conversely, the periodic  closure of the high-yield 
bond market (as in 1990, 1994 and 1998) could lead to a fall in overall financing if companies that have 
been accessing high yield bonds are unable to access banking markets. We would expect that high 
yield bond issues would have a separate effect on total, securities and loan financing if this were the 
case. Following the methodology above, we incorporated an instrumented difference of real high-yield 
bond issues and a lagged ratio to investment in each equation. The results are shown in Table 20. The 
high yield issues are not significant except in the bond issue equation themselves. This implies that the 
existing variables in equations 15-18 continue alone to explain total financing and loan financing, and the 
opening of high-yie ld markets has not had a marked - or at least stable - effect on them. 
 
4.3 Are errors in the equations consistent with offsetting “supply effects” on credit 
granted? 
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We now go on to use the equations to cast further light on the changes in financing after the crises 
which were discussed in Section 2.2. We seek to use the equations’ fitted values when periods of 
financial turbulence highlighted in Section 2 took place, to provide a benchmark for changes in issuance 
and borrowing. They should for example give an idea of whether a fall in lending would have been 
expected on a normal cyclical basis, rather than being due to systemic risks affecting the financial 
system. In contrast, the equation errors may be attributable to extraneous factors including systemic 
problems affecting credit supply. Technically, we add dummy variables for the period of the shock and 
the quarter afterwards to the above described equations for the different types of financing. A negative 
(positive) error suggests a priori that there is a greater fall (rise) in issuance or lending than would be 
anticipated by looking at general economic conditions, averaged out over the sample period. This 
suggests that there could have been a separate supply side effect operating on the market, be it a direct 
effect of systemic risk (if negative) or an offset by the market that was unaffected and is hence facing 
unexpected demands for funds from creditworthy borrowers (if positive). Note that since the equations 
are in first differences, a single decline that is not offset in the next quarter implies a sustained fall in 
actual flows. The accuracy of this method is limited by shortcomings in the data, estimation and 
specification, but they should nonetheless give some idea of the direction and size of the shock. 
 
The results are shown in Table 21. Many of the dummies are consistent in sign and magnitude with the 
a priori suggestions made about offsetting shifts in financing made in Section 2.2 (commenting on 
Tables 3,5,7 and 9). On the other hand, the implied shocks are also generally within the bounds of 2 
standard errors of the estimates, thus casting some doubt on the supply side effects. This may of 
course reflect the imperfection of the equations rather than a strong conclusion that no independent 
supply side effect was operating. 
 
Looking first at the US, the pattern of signs in 1974 is consistent with offsetting rises in securities 
relative to their long run determinants and falls in bank lending. A consistent (and statistically 
significant) shift in the opposite direction (i.e. a rise in bank lending offsetting weak bond issuance) is 
found after Russia/LTCM, consistent with contemporary accounts (IMF 1998) and Greenspan’s 
remarks (2000). In 1991 there is a clear and significant fall in lending below its long term determinants 
(the so-called “capital crunch”) while the bond market effect is estimated to be zero; in 1994 a bond 
market decline is only initially offset by a rise in bank lending relative to the predicted level. In 1982, 
where as shown in Table 3 both lending and issuance fell, it is the bond market effect that is shown to 
be significantly unusual relative to the average. The 1987 crash’s effect on debt markets is put in 
perspective by positive dummies in the equations (i.e. financing was higher than anticipated). 
                                                                                                                                               
11  Thanks are due to Sandeep Sarangi of the Federal Raeserve Board for providing these data. 
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In the UK and Japan, the size of the negative dummies in bank lending relative to the positive one in the 
bond market casts further light on the weakness of the securities markets in those countries as a means 
of stabilising corporate financing. Falls in lending relative to historical trends are particularly marked in 
1991 in the UK and in 1998 in Japan. Finally in Canada in 1985 the most significant effect is a recovery 
in bond issuance relative to the equation prediction in the quarter after the crisis. 
 
Concluding this section, the tentative econometric work presented tends to support the suggestion made 
by examining the data in Section 2, namely that multiple channels of intermediation provide stabilisation 
to corporate financing, both on average over time and (more tentatively) in periods of crisis. Of 
particular interest is the cyclical nature of bank financing, while securities fluctuate largely in response 
to market conditions. This section strengthens the conclusion to the extent that we are allowing for the 
economic determinants of corporate financing which would be expected to operate in normal times, 
when there is no systemic problem affecting the banks or markets. The fact that many of the dummies 
are insignificant offers some counter evidence. The work is of course also subject to standard caveats 
of any econometric work, such as the risk that structural change may future patterns different as well 
as imperfections in the specification and estimation methods used.  
 
Before concluding the paper, we go on to consider certain financial, policy and conceptual issues that 
arise from “multiple channels”. In combination with the statistical work, they help also to provide a 
suggested agenda for future work. 
 
5 Analytical and policy issues arising 
 
Is there true independence between banking and bond markets such that one may truly be 
unscathed if the other is in crisis? One feature is that banks often provide backups for commercial 
paper programmes, meaning that CP may not be readily issuable when banks are in crisis. A second is 
that bank financing is typically needed in order for primary bond markets to operate, e.g. via 
underwriting, as well as providing finance for the operation of trading markets in securities and 
derivatives. Banks in effect provide “insurance” to the markets. This is particularly the case where 
there is universal banking where commercial banks provide market financing direct. Arguably the 
markets in the US and Japan have in the past been partly insulated from banking difficulties by the 
separation of commercial and investment banking - although commercial bank financing of investment 
banks was still important even when such separation was effective, as experience in the 1987 crash 
showed. 
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Third, US experience shows that bond markets generally find rescheduling after financial distress 
difficult, and banks generally play a major role in restructuring, acting in many ways like German or 
Japanese relationship banks (Gilson et al 1990). Meanwhile, banks may rely to some extent on bond 
and short term paper issuance to finance lending, so that a liquidity problem in the securities markets 
could have feedback effects on lending. A severe crisis affecting both markets is hence conceivable, 
although it has not yet occurred under postwar conditions. 
 
Will some sectors of the economy still be vulnerable even if there are effective multiple 
channels of intermediation? Besides smoothing, the fact that bond issuance is less cyclical than bank 
lending may partly reflect credit rationing for loans, with the largest firms being unaffected by the cycle 
and the small firms confined to the banks, as highlighted by the theories of intermediation, being badly 
affected. It is notable that the opening of the high yield bond market has increased the cyclicality of US 
bond market financing, suggesting a greater role for rationing (although the borrowers could still 
generally access bank credit, given the hierarchy of access to credit. A corollary may be that if the 
large firms were confined to banks, that bank lending would be less cyclical. This would seem plausible, 
since the credit quality of large firms is inherently more stable than that of small firms, with their 
operations being more diversified, and more transparent. On the other hand, large firms in bank 
dominated economies would remain vulnerable to supply side effects arising from banking failures 
independent of their own credit quality, to the extent that they cannot access the international capital 
markets. This was of course the difficulty faced by solvent companies during the Asian crisis. 
 
On the other hand, the distinctions made above between types of borrowers may be diminishing, as 
witness for example the growth of securitisation even for small-firm loans. This could mean that a 
banking market collapse could at a certain stage in financial development, perhaps not yet reached 
even in the US, be followed by a switch to securitised lending even for borrowers which were 
historically confined to banks12. 
 
What are the relative costs of a crisis in the securities markets compared to banking?  It 
appears that in each case there has been quite rapid recovery in debt-securities financing following 
crises in the securities markets. This may link to the contrasting nature of systemic risks  in the two 
markets. As has been argued elsewhere (Davis 1994, 1999b) both banking and securities markets may 
be subject to liquidity crises. For banking, as set out by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), these arise from 
                                              
12  See recent papers on theory of intermediation by Allen and Santomero (199 8) and Scholtens and 
Wensveen (1999), who question the relevance of the traditional theories of intermediation set out in Section 3.2 
for contemporary banking activity. 
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maturity transformation, imperfect information regarding the bank's assets, inability of the bank to sell 
or cash illiquid assets (i.e. loans) at par, and the "sequential servicing" process whereby claims are 
distributed. There is thus an incentive for panic runs by depositors even if banks are solvent. 
Meanwhile if doubt arises over the future liquidity of a debt securities market for whatever reason (it 
could be heightened credit risk or market risk), it is rational to sell first before the disequilibrium 
between buyers and sellers becomes too great, and market failure occurs (i.e.  yields are driven up 
sharply, and selling in quantity becomes extremely difficult). Sellers may either seek cash or more 
reliably liquid instruments. Moreover, if it is not always be easy for market participants to distinguish 
liquidity and credit shocks, then disruption to markets may be aggravated. Such crises may be more 
common when market making is of low profitability and market makers are poorly capitalised. Liquidity 
crises in both banking and bond markets can have adverse effects on corporate borrowers which 
cannot readily switch sources of finance, as well as on investors dependent on the liquidity of their 
claims. 
 
There are several reasons why securities market crises may be less damaging and protracted than 
banking crises. First, the parallels made above between crises in banks and securities markets are not 
exact, since securities investors who are not constrained to sell do not make a loss by “sitting tight” – 
the underlying value of their assets arising from income streams does not change purely in the case of 
temporary liquidity failure (although marking to market means that their balance sheets will be 
affected). In contrast, banks can clearly become insolvent. And indeed, as shown by Gorton (1988), 
although bank liquidity crises can be “sunspots”, they are typically triggered by solvency concerns. In 
other words, markets, unlike banks, may become illiquid but cannot become insolvent and may hence 
more readily recover.  
 
In this context, approaching bank ins olvency can be obscured by the lack of pricing of intermediated 
claims. A related point is that since risk is priced in the securities markets, concerns about solvency 
problems among borrowers are likely to emerge at a much earlier stage than for loans held on banks’ 
books. This gives an independent reason why banks are more vulnerable to solvency problems.  
 
Second, difficulties arise for issuers when market have a liquidity crisis arise only in the case that an 
existing securities issue is maturing and needs rolling over – or there is a pressing need for a further 
issue - when the liquidity problem arises. Loans generally have a shorter maturity, and banks in 
difficulty may be forced to call loans. These suggest there will be more “breathing room” for the 
economy when markets collapse than when banks fail. 
 
 - 26 - 
 
Third, given that bank lending involves private information, banking failures are more likely to generate 
deadweight loss of information to the economy in the manner pinpointed by Bernanke (1983) as 
occurring during the Great Depression. Since information in the bond markets is public, it is more 
readily utilised by other providers of credit (e.g. in the lending or international markets) when securities 
markets suffer liquidity failure. And since information is not destroyed in this way, markets can operate 
freely as soon as the liquidity blockage is removed, as was the case in the events pinpointed in this 
paper, while banking crises may involve prolonged falls in lending. Finally, banks may also be more 
vulnerable to “herding” and concentrating their risks in sectors such as real estate than are markets. 
 
There are clear implications from these arguments for the need for risk to be priced into financial 
instruments, as is the case for securities markets as opposed to banks. Transparency is indicated to be 
better for financial stability. 
 
What was the role of the authorities in the various episodes? Generally, they have sought to 
defuse what is considered to be systemic risk by liquidity and interest rate policies, as in the US interest 
rate cuts in 1982, 1987 and 1998. But there is arguably also much more implicit and explicit protection 
for banking than for securities markets, although the latter is seen to be stabilising corporate financing. 
Conceptually, the authorities could be seen, following the argument above, to be protecting the private 
information that banks accumulate (as well as protecting depositors and the deposit insurance system). 
But transparency and further market development may improve stability without a need for such a 
broad safety net. 
 
Are there any benefits to bank domination, given the thrust of this paper is the benefit of 
securities markets and consequent “multiple channels”? In this context it is interesting to begin 
by citing the views of Allen and Gale (1997) that Anglo-American capital markets dominated by 
institutional investors may have a disadvantage in terms of risk sharing, despite their “multiple 
intermediation buffers”. In effect, competition and opportunities for arbitrage are said to constrain 
intermediaries - including banks - to only carry out cross-sectional risk sharing, i.e. exchanges of risk 
among individuals at a given point in time. This, it is argued, leaves non-financial firms more vulnerable 
to undiversifiable  risks arising over time, e.g. owing to macroeconomic shocks 13. In contrast, financial 
systems where banks have some monopoly power over savers facilitate elimination of such 
intertemporal risks by accumulation of reserves and smoothing of returns over time .  
 
                                              
13  . In Anglo-American countries, the focus on cross-sectional risk sharing may help explain the intense 
focus on risk management via derivatives (Allen and Santomero 1999). 
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As noted, one counter argument is that banking failures in bank dominated systems are likely to be 
much more damaging. Even abstracting from this, as argued by Greenspan (1999), the benefits of 
intertemporal risk sharing as practised in Continental Europe may require less efficient allocation and 
utilisation of capital, given the apparent need for intensive involvement of the public sector in the 
banking system (including direct ownership) in order to provide “insurance”. Furthermore, the 
distinction may be less clear cut than Allen and Gale suggest, since Anglo-Saxon systems have 
intertemporal smoothing via “market-priced” forms of insurance such as backup credit lines, 
commitments etc. 
 
The argument here could be turned on its head and posed as the que stion whether there are any 
disadvantages to having large securities markets? In general the answer is no, but with one proviso, 
namely that multiple avenues will only be effective when sectors are of comparable size. If banks 
declined to a low level, they could not provide effective substitute finance in a securities market crisis. 
Moreover, it may be noted that securities market crises are typically international rather than purely 
domestic, implying global ramifications absent for most banking crises. 
 
What behavior in terms of smoothing could be expected of a system in transition towards a 
greater role for capital markets – as is the case for the EMU countries? Following the above 
discussion of intertemporal smoothing via relationship banking, financial integration, openness to global 
markets and institutional-investor growth are likely to transform European systems to securitisation. 
This will incidentally reduce the benefits of intertemporal smoothing as per Allen and Gale, since savers 
will not accept lower yields on their deposits than obtainable via securities markets, while borrowers 
may also seek cheaper financing outside their traditional relationships (see Petersen and Rajan 1993). 
This means the behaviour of “Anglo Saxon” financial systems as illustrated in this paper is of 
considerable relevance as a model for the future.  
 
But one can also ask whether there will also there be a period of transition in EMU before multiple 
intermediation becomes effective, when the system could be especially vulne rable to systemic risks in 
the banking system. It can be argued (see Davis (2000)) that this will be the case, as banks are 
challenged by heightened cross border competition, nascent securities markets and exiting excess 
capacity. Fully functioning securities markets cannot develop overnight but need infrastructure such as 
alternative means of corporate control (hostile take-overs and direct influence by institutional investors) 
as well as means of reducing asymmetric information and aiding control by debt holders (rating 
agencies, changes in credit structure and possibly a lower debt/equity ratio). This risk was arguably 
realised to some extent in Japan, and EMU countries may need to study closely the transition that the 
Japanese financial system is passing through at present (see also Hoshi et al (1999), Nakaso (1999)). 
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Further research and analysis in the area of “multiple avenues” could include the following: 
· Assessment of the funding of unincorporated/small firms – do they benefit or lose out as the 
financial system becomes more diversified?  
· Examination within the flow of funds data of the sources of funds for new securities market 
financing when they “fill the gap” during a banking crisis. 
· Investigation of patterns of bank financing in Germany and France, as well as in Sweden, where 
the contribution of securities issuance to corporate financing is small. 
· Focus on bank capital in the loans equations as a possible source of constraint on bank lending (as 
in the US “capital crunch” of the early 1990s). 
· Different estimation techniques for the econometrics, including VARs which incorporate both bond 
issuance and lending, which could enable some of the effects of cyclical and financial variables to 
be distinguished via impulse response functions 14. 
· Further consideration of policy issues, in particular those which enhance transparency, help to 
develop securities markets or render securities markets less vulnerable to liquidity failure. Note that 
although property rights, accounting standards, transparency etc. may be necessary conditions, it is 
not clear they are sufficient, as witness the UK experience of weak domestic securities markets. 
Arguably a strong institutional investor sector focused on debt securities is also needed. 
· Further consideration of the benefit s of openness and the buffer role of international capital 
markets. Do the favourable indications shown in the data apply only to advanced economies (which 
are less likely than emerging markets to face sudden constraints on international borrowing). 
· Use of micro data for the international capital markets to assess changing maturity of financings 
and credit quality of issuers during periods of turbulence. Following Davis and Mayer (1991) such 
an examination would also cast light on the nature of financial intermediation more generally. Note 
in this context that international markets may offer a cleaner dataset for examining the substitution 
between securities and lending, given all firms in the international market are of a certain size and 
credit quality, while domestic markets feature many firms that could not access securities markets. 
· Analysis of the substitution role of offshore markets. 
 
Conclusions  
 
                                              
14  Using a VAR, besides obviously examining the effects of shocks in securities and loans on the “other 
form of financing”, one could assess the effects of liquidity shocks (rise in short rates) and solvency shocks (rise 
in credit quality spread) on financing. 
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This paper has provided evidence on the benefits to an economy from “multiple intermediation 
buffers”. The overall conclusion is that the existence of active securities markets alongside banks is 
indeed beneficial to the stability of corporate financing, both during cyclical downturns and during 
banking and securities market crises. The benefits are to limit volatility arising from the normal patterns 
of credit demand and supply that obtain over the cycle, and changes in agency costs as companies’ net 
worth varies. While bank lending is largely cyclical, securities financing is more highly responsive to 
indicators of agency costs, implying a degree of complementarity in response to shocks. They also 
restrict the impact of undue limits on credit availability arising solely from weakness on the supply side, 
be it from liquidity crises in the securities markets or from liquidity or solvency problems among 
financial intermediaries. The benefit will be greater, the more comparable the size of securities market 
and intermediated financing, as well as the larger the proportion of companies able to access both loan 
and securities markets. The analysis raises a number of policy issues and research topics for further 
investigation. 
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Table 1: Corporate external financing/GDP 
  % of GDP % of GDP 
since 1985 
S.d.% of GDP S.d.% GDP 
since 1985 
US       
Credit market  3.15 2.92 1.65 1.89 
Securities  1.65 1.81 0.72 0.84 
Loans  1.50 1.11 1.48 1.44 
      
UK      
Credit market  3.57 4.15 3.20 3.83 
Securities  0.67 1.20 1.04 1.25 
Loans  2.90 2.96 2.92 3.41 
      
Japan      
Credit market  4.94 3.63 4.46 4.94 
Securities  0.54 0.77 0.93 1.26 
Loans  4.40 2.86 4.07 4.09 
      
Canada       
Credit market  4.31 3.30 2.66 1.96 
Securities  2.01 1.65 1.49 1.70 
Loans  2.30 1.64 2.37 1.77 
 
Table 2: Volatility and correlation of real corporate debt financing flows  
  Coefficient of 
variation 
Correlations    
US     Credit market  Securities Loans 
Credit market  0.59  1.00   
Securities  0.56  0.64 1.00  
Loans  1.01  0.86 0.16 1.00 
       
UK       
Credit market  1.03  1.00   
Securities  1.72  0.60 1.00  
Loans  1.10  0.94 0.28 1.00 
       
Japan       
Credit market  1.03  1.00   
Securities  2.04  0.64 1.00  
Loans  1.01  0.97 0.45 1.00 
       
Canada        
Credit market  0.61  1.00   
Securities  0.77  0.45 1.00  
Loans  1.04  0.81 -0.15 1.00 
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Table 3: Corporate debt financing amid financial turbulence – United States 1970-1999 
Billions of USD, 1995 prices/% of GDP, Annual rates 
      Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
US Franklin National (Q2 1974)  Credit market  
O/w 
249 208 149 5.3 4.5 3.2 
    Securities  55 83 95 1.2 1.8 2.1 
    Loans  194 125 54 4.1 2.7 1.2 
US Mexican default (Q3 1982)   Credit market  
O/w 
211 178 100 4.1 3.5 1.9 
    Securities  83 59 55 1.6 1.2 1.1 
    Loans  129 119 45 2.5 2.3 0.9 
US Stock market crash (Q4 1987)  Credit market  
O/w 
234 269 289 3.7 4.2 4.4 
    Securities  106 76 126 1.7 1.2 1.9 
    Loans  128 193 163 2.0 3.0 2.5 
US Bank capital crunch (Q1 1991)  Credit market  
O/w 
149 -50 -51 2.2 -0.8 -0.8 
    Securities  66 59 66 1.0 0.9 1.0 
    Loans  83 -109 -117 1.2 -1.6 -1.8 
US Bond market reversal (Q1 1994) Credit market  
O/w 
50 138 141 0.7 1.9 1.9 
    Securities  97 60 53 1.4 0.8 0.7 
    Loans  -47 78 88 -0.7 1.1 1.2 
US Russia/LTCM (Q3 1998)  Credit market  
O/w 
367 334 406 4.6 4.1 4.9 
    Securities  240 186 227 3.0 2.3 2.7 
    Loans  127 149 180 1.6 1.8 2.2 
 
 - 32 - 
 
Table 4: Equity issuance, trade credit and total liabilities – US 1970-99 
Billions of USD, 1995 prices/% of GDP, Annual rates 
      Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
US Franklin National (Q2 1974)  Trade credit 121 124 46 2.6 2.7 1.0 
    Equity issuance 26 16 13 0.5 0.3 0.3 
    Total liabilities 419 376 236 8.8 8.1 5.1 
US Mexican default (Q3 1982)   Trade credit -12 42 5 -0.2 0.8 0.1 
    Equity issuance -23 -12 28 -0.4 -0.2 0.5 
    Total liabilities 309 339 216 5.9 6.6 4.1 
US Stock market crash (Q4 1987)   Trade credit 48 88 60 0.8 1.4 0.9 
    Equity issuance -101 -148 -142 -1.6 -2.3 -2.2 
    Total liabilities 316 520 427 5.0 8.0 6.5 
US Bank capital crunch (Q1 1991)  Trade credit 34 -53 26 0.5 -0.8 0.4 
    Equity issuance -73 -7 20 -1.1 -0.1 0.3 
    Total liabilities 214 94 75 3.2 1.4 1.1 
US Bond market reversal (Q1 1994) Trade credit 38 53 79 0.5 0.7 1.1 
    Equity issuance 22 -10 -46 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 
    Total liabilities 230 144 248 3.3 2.0 3.4 
US Russia/LTCM (Q3 1998)  Trade credit 45 0 38 0.6 0.0 0.4 
    Equity issuance -126 -288 -276 -1.6 -3.5 -3.3 
    Total liabilities 384 476 531 4.8 5.8 6.4 
 
Table 5: Corporate debt financing amid financial turbulence – United Kingdom 1970-1999 
Billions of GBP, 1995 prices/% of GDP, Annual Rates 
 
      Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
UK Secondary banking crisis (Q4 1973) Credit market  
O/w 
27.3 50.5 32.9 5.9  10.9 7.3  
    Securities  0.7  0.3  -0.1 0.2  0.1  0.0  
    Loans  26.5 50.2 33.0 5.7  10.9 7.3  
UK Small banks crisis (Q1 1991)  Credit market  
O/w 
37.7 7.3  9.0  5.7  4.4  1.4  
    Securities  4.3  0.9  6.2  0.7  0.5  0.9  
    Loans  33.4 6.4  2.8  5.1  3.9  0.4  
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Table 6: Equity issuance, foreign financing and total liabilities – UK 1970-2000 
Billions of GBP, 1995 prices/% of GDP, Annual rates 
      Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
UK Secondary banking crisis (Q4 1973) Overseas finance 9.3 6.6 11.4 2.0 1.4 2.5 
    Equity issuance 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
    Total liabilities 34.9 60.2 44.5 7.5 13.0 9.8 
UK Small banks crisis (Q1 1991)  Overseas finance 22.8 5.1 18.2 3.5 0.8 2.8 
    Equity issuance 3.4 1.0 13.1 0.5 0.1 2.0 
    Total liabilities 63.9 13.3 40.3 9.7 2.0 6.2 
 
Table 7: Corporate debt financing amid financial turbulence – Japan 1970-1999 
Trillions of JPY, 1995 prices/% of GDP, Annual rates 
 
  Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Japanese monetary tightening/credit 
restrictions (Q3 1990) 
Credit market  
O/w 
73.9 71.6 49.2 10.3 9.6 6.6 
    Securities  12.0 8.2 5.2 1.7 1.1 0.7 
    Loans  61.8 63.4 44.0 8.6 8.5 5.9 
Japanese banking crisis (Q4 1993)  
 
 Credit market 
O/w 
18.9 31.5 4.8 2.5 4.1 0.6 
    Securities  2.5 6.2 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.1 
    Loans  16.5 25.3 3.8 2.2 3.3 0.5 
Japan Yamaichi/LTCB failures (Q4 
1997) 
Credit market  
O/w 
1.8 56.0 -6.3 0.3 7.1 -0.8 
    Securities  2.3 3.8 1.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 
    Loans  -0.5 52.2 -7.9 0.0 6.6 -1.0 
 
Table 8: Trade credit – Japan 1970-2000 
Trillions of JPY, 1995 prices/% of GDP, Annual rates 
  Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Japanese monetary tightening/credit 
restrictions (Q3 1990) 
Trade credit 27.7 23.0 14.6 3.9 3.1 1.9 
Japanese banking crisis (Q4 1993)  
 
 Trade credit -4.5 55.2 -1.4 -0.6 7.2 -0.2 
Japan Yamaichi/LTCB failures (Q4 
1997) 
Trade credit 7.0 37.3 -19.6 0.8 4.7 -2.5 
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Table 9: Corporate debt financing amid financial turbulence – Canada 1970-2000 
Billions of C$, 1995 prices/% of GDP, Annual rates 
  Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Canada Northland Banking Crisis (Q2 
1985) 
Credit market  
O/w 
17.7 7.0 20.5 2.7 1.1 3.1 
    Securities 6.2 -0.2 7.1 0.9 0.0 1.1 
    Loans 11.6 7.1 13.4 1.8 1.1 2.0 
 
Table 10: Corporate debt financing amid financial turbulence – Canada 1970-2000 
Billions of C$, 1995 prices/% of GDP, Annual rates 
   Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Year 
before 
Quarter 
of crisis 
Year 
after 
Canada Northland Banking Crisis (Q2 
1985) 
Trade credit  4.1 -1.2 0.9 0.6 -0.2 0.1 
    Equity issuance 13.2 21.2 15.0 2.0 3.2 2.3 
    Total liabilities  37.1 18.9 38.1 5.7 2.9 5.7 
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Table 11: Volatility and correlation of gross corporate debt financing in international capital 
markets 
 
  Coefficient of variation Correlations   
US     Eurobonds Credit 
facilities 
Total  
Eurobonds  1.28  1.00    
Credit facilities 1.02  0.75 1.00   
Total euromarket 1.02  0.80 1.00 1.00  
Memo: Total credit market finance Na  0.74 0.63 0.66 1.00 
        
UK        
Eurobonds  1.17  1.00    
Credit facilities 1.16  0.70 1.00   
Total euromarket 1.11  0.80 0.99 1.00  
Memo: Total credit market finance Na  0.66 0.61 0.66 1.00 
        
Japan        
Eurobonds  0.91  1.00    
Credit facilities 3.02  -0.11 1.00   
Total euromarket 0.85  0.86 0.41 1.00  
Memo: Total credit market finance na  0.36 -0.34 0.15 1.00 
        
Canada         
Eurobonds  0.99  1.00    
Credit facilities 0.90  0.23 1.00   
Total euromarket 0.82  0.38 0.99 1.00  
Memo: Total credit market finance na  -0.10 0.22 0.19 1.00 
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Table 12: Changes in corporate financing in international capital markets during turbulence  
Billions of US dollars equivalent 
(4Q/4Q % 
change) 
 Mexican default Stock market crash Bond market Russia/LTC
M 
 Q3 1982  Q4 1987  Q1 1994  Q4 1998 
EUROBONDS        
US  41.85  -29.41  19.09  58.14 
UK  413.60  12.32  -40.78  60.94 
Japan  -61.94  4.62  -45.97  -30.92 
Canada   -29.63  11.50  -14.55  37.79 
         
SYNDICATED CREDITS AND NOTE FACILITIES 
US  -73.58  73.11  52.40  -14.93 
UK  -15.90  99.92  64.97  -9.61 
Japan  2489.15  4347.70  -12.38  2989.78 
Canada   -9.80  295.58  66.22  -10.90 
         
SYNDICATED CREDITS 
US  -83.50  89.39  56.61  -14.06 
UK  -47.85  394.20  89.27  -14.05 
Japan  na  na  0.53  3162.31 
Canada   667.74  441.46  75.36  -14.25 
         
TOTAL         
US  -64.54  54.51  50.31  -9.72 
UK  21.14  79.61  24.47  4.35 
Japan  -45.54  11.85  -45.54  119.43 
Canada   -15.26  225.57  41.82  -7.15 
 
Table 13: Changes in financing of domestic companies in international capital markets during 
domestic turbulence  
Billions of US dollar equivalents 
(4Q/4Q % change) US bank 
capital 
crunch 
UK small 
banks 
Japan 
tightening 
Japan crisis Japan 
failures 
Canada 
Northlands 
  Q1 1991 Q1 1991 Q3 1990 Q4 1993 Q4 1997 Q2 1985 
Eurobonds  23.76 68.07 23.83 -16.08 -47.17 178.32 
Credits and facilities  -16.19 -25.96 -90.36 -12.38 48.09 100.93 
Credits  -15.34 -31.05 -89.26 0.53 42.17 114.93 
Total  -14.02 -14.79 8.35 -16.03 -43.73 111.34 
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Table 14: Dickey-Fuller Unit Root tests 
 
** denotes stationarity accepted at 95%; * at 90% 
D1 indicates a first-differenced variable 
 
 US UK Japan Canada  
D1 Real Securities -4.9** -1.1 -3.8** -4.3** 
D1 Real loans -6.2** -4.9** -3.6** -8.1** 
D1 Real borrowing -5.5** -5.0** -3.2* -7.1** 
D1 Investment -3.7** -4.7** -3.2* -3.5** 
D1 Short rate -3.9** -6.0** -3.8** -4.1** 
D1 Corporate risk 
spread 
-4.2** -5.7** -5.4** -4.0** 
D1D1 Share prices -6.0** -5.4** -6.0** -5.1** 
D1 Term structure -6.2** -6.6** -6.0** -4.1** 
Securities/investment 
ratio 
-3.2* -0.1 -1.8 -4.0** 
Loans/investment ratio -3.2* -3.1* -1.8 -4.0** 
Borrowing/investment 
ratio 
-2.8 -2.6 -1.7 -3.6** 
Investment/GDP ratio -2.5 -3.0 -2.1 -3.9** 
Term structure -2.9 -2.4 -3.1* -3.1 
Short rate -2.5 -2.9 -3.5** -2.6 
D1 Share prices -6.4** -5.6** -4.1** -6.1** 
Corporate risk 
premium 
-3.9** -3.0 -3.4** -3.7** 
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Table 15 Econometric estimates for changes in flows of external finance - United States 
(1970Q3-1999Q4); t values in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable 
Independent variables 
D1 Real credit market 
financing  
D1 Real securities issuance D1 Real intermediated lending 
Constant -2531 
(3.0) 
375 
(4.2) 
434 
(4.3) 
D1 Real investment 1271 
(4.6) 
317 
(1.8) 
792 
(2.7)  
D1 Short rate  -106 
(2.4) 
 
D1 Credit spread   -571 
(2.6) 
D1D1 Share price  -2264 
(2.2) 
1526 
(2.7) 
-4159 
(4.1) 
D1 Term spread  -129 
(3.0) 
 
Financing/Investment ratio  
(-1) 
-4.8 
(6.3) 
-33 
(5.5) 
-4.0 
(5.7) 
Investment/GDP ratio (-1) 21840 
(3.7) 
  
Term spread (-1)  -33 
(1.5) 
 
Short rate (-1)    
D1 Share price (-1) -2920 
(2.3) 
1159 
(1.7) 
-4852 
(3.6) 
Credit spread (-1)    
R2 0.33 0.27 0.35 
DW 2.3 2.3 2.3 
SE 649 351 649 
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Table 16 Econometric estimates for changes in flows of external finance - United Kingdom 
(1970Q2-1999Q4) ; t values in parentheses. 
 D1 Real credit market 
financing  
D1 Real securities issuance D1 Real intermediated lending 
Constant -45 
(1.1) 
20 
(3.5) 
-115 
(2.9) 
D1 Real investment 1696 
(3.6) 
 1912 
(4.5) 
D1 Short rate    
D1 Credit spread    
D1D1 Share price   21.9 
(1.9) 
 
D1 Term spread    
Financing/Investment ratio  
(-1) 
-0.15 
(6.1) 
-0.13 
(5.4) 
-0.21 
(7.8) 
Investment/GDP ratio (-1) 393 
(1.7) 
 804 
(3.7) 
Term spread (-1)  -1.52 
(2.9) 
-3.4 
(2.6) 
Short rate (-1)  -1.6 
(3.3) 
 
D1 Share price (-1)   -89 
(2.3) 
Credit spread (-1)    
R2 0.31 0.2 0.47 
DW 2.2 2.1 2.2 
SE 40 13 34 
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Table 17: Econometric estimates for changes in flows of external finance - Japan 
(1970Q2-1999Q4) ; t values in parentheses. 
 D1 Real credit market 
financing  
D1 Real securities issuance D1 Real intermediated lending 
Constant -1133 
(1.8) 
192 
(4.9) 
-1001 
(1.7) 
D1 Real investment   3.5 
(2.1) 
D1 Short rate    
D1 Credit spread    
D1D1 Share price  1313 
(1.9) 
  
D1 Term spread    
Financing/Investment ratio  
(-1) 
-684 
(6.1) 
-1252 
(9.5) 
-850 
(6.8) 
Investment/GDP ratio (-1) 6444 
(3.0) 
 5107 
(2.4) 
Term spread (-1)    
Short rate (-1)  15 
(1.8) 
52 
(2.3) 
D1 Share price (-1) 2472 
(3.2) 
354 
(1.8) 
1504 
(2.7) 
Credit spread (-1)    
R2 0.56 0.59 0.56 
DW 506 153 425 
SE 2.6 2.1 2.5 
Note: Dummy in securities equation for deregulation of the bond market (1 to Q4 1984, 0 thereafter); 
coefficient –140 (3.3) 
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Table 18: Econometric estimates for changes in flows of external finance - Canada 
(1970Q3-1999Q4) ; t values in parentheses. 
 D1 Real credit market 
financing  
D1 Real securities issuance D1 Real intermediated lending 
Constant -405 
(3.5) 
-211 
(2.5) 
-58 
(0.5) 
D1 Real investment 520 
(2.0) 
 969 
(3.2) 
D1 Short rate 24.1 
(2.7) 
-22 
(2.9) 
46 
(5.0) 
D1 Credit spread   -140 
(1.8) 
D1D1 Share price    -321 
(3.0) 
D1 Term spread    
Financing/Investment ratio  
(-1) 
-0.86 
(7.0) 
-1.7 
(13.7) 
-1.1 
(9.4) 
Investment/GDP ratio (-1) 3067 
(4.3) 
1724 
(1.3) 
1040 
(1.9) 
Term spread (-1)   -28 
(3.7) 
Short rate (-1)    
D1 Share price (-1)   -457 
(2.1) 
Credit spread (-1) -73 
(1.9) 
  
R2 0.39 0.62 0.54 
DW 2.2 2.0 2.2 
SE 98 89 101 
 
Table 19: Inclusion of “other flows” in the loan and securities equations  
(* instrumented by three lags) 
 Loan equation Securities equation 
Country Difference of real 
bonds*  
Lagged 
bond/investment 
ratio 
Difference of real 
loans* 
Lagged 
loan/investment 
ratio 
US -0.1 (1.9) 443 (2.4) -0.4 (2.4) 889 (3.0) 
UK - - 0.06 (1.8)  - 
Japan - - 0.1 (2.3) 105 (2.6) 
Canada  -0.36 (3.6) 0.47 (3.0)  -0.36 (4.8) - 
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Table 20: Inclusion of “high yield bond issues” in the US credit market, loan and securities 
equations 
(* instrumented by three lags) 
Equation Credit market 
financing 
 Securities 
financing 
 Loan financing  
Data period Difference of 
real high yield 
bonds*  
Lagged high 
yield bond/ 
investment 
ratio 
Difference of 
real high yield 
bonds*  
Lagged high 
yield bond/ 
investment 
ratio 
Difference of 
real high yield 
bonds*  
Lagged high 
yield bond/ 
investment 
ratio 
1971-99 - - 3.8 (4.4) - - - 
1982-99 - - 3.5 (3.1) - - - 
 
 
Table 21: Dummies in equations for shifts in financing after crises 
(* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95% level) 
Country Period Dummy for 
credit market 
financing 
Dummy for 
securities 
financing 
Dummy for loan 
financing 
US (USD billion 
AR) 
Q2 74 34 13 -12 
 Q3 74 -1 31 -52 
 Q3 82 34 -21 40 
 Q4 82 -111 -84** -5 
 Q4 87 20 29 2 
 Q1 88 59 -3 31 
 Q1 91 -96 -33 -124* 
 Q2 91 58 24 -22 
 Q1 94 31 -28 36 
 Q2 94 -42 -1 -71 
 Q3 98 -60 -55 16 
 Q4 98 20 -66* 137** 
UK (GBP billion 
AR) 
Q4 73 18 1 24 
 Q1 74 -6 2 4 
 Q1 91 3 -2 -4 
 Q2 91 -16 2 -24* 
Japan (JPY 
trillion AR) 
Q3 90 905* 108 534 
 Q4 90 506 239 -28 
 Q4 93 -37 -80 -93 
 Q1 94 -471 -84 -308 
 Q4 97 825* -121 779* 
 Q1 98 -2222** -222 -1851** 
Canada (C$ 
billion AR)  
Q2 85 -14 -13 -1 
 Q3 85 13 19** -13 
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Chart 1: US corporate debt securities issuance and 
intermediated borrowing (1995 prices)
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Chart 2: Shares of US corporate borrowing
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Chart 3: Japanese real securities issuance and borrowing 
(1995 prices)
- 2 5 0 0 0 0
- 2 0 0 0 0 0
- 1 5 0 0 0 0
- 1 0 0 0 0 0
- 5 0 0 0 0
0
5 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 5 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0 0
Q 1      1 9 7 0 Q 1      1 9 7 3 Q 1      1 9 7 6 Q 1      1 9 7 9 Q 1      1 9 8 2 Q 1      1 9 8 5 Q 1      1 9 8 8 Q 1      1 9 9 1 Q 1      1 9 9 4 Q 1      1 9 9 7 Q 1      2 0 0 0
Y
 m
ill
io
n
Real securities issuance Real loans Real borrowing
 
 
Chart 4: Shares of Japanese corporate borrowing
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Chart 5: UK corporate debt securities issuance and 
intermediated borrowing (1995 prices)
- 1 0 0 0 0 . 0 0
- 5 0 0 0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
5 0 0 0 . 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 . 0 0
1 5 0 0 0 . 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 . 0 0
2 5 0 0 0 . 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 . 0 0
3 5 0 0 0 . 0 0
Q 1      1 9 7 0 Q 1      1 9 7 3 Q 1      1 9 7 6 Q 1      1 9 7 9 Q 1      1 9 8 2 Q 1      1 9 8 5 Q 1      1 9 8 8 Q 1      1 9 9 1 Q 1      1 9 9 4 Q 1      1 9 9 7 Q 1      2 0 0 0
G
B
P 
m
ill
io
n
Real debt securities Real loans Real borrowing
 
 
Chart 6: Shares of UK corporate borrowing
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Chart 7: Canadian corporate debt securities issuance and 
intermediated borrowing (1995 prices)
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Chart 8: Shares of Canadian corporate borrowing
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Chart 9: US high-yield bond issuance (1995 prices)
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